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The SNP have concluded that the political weather to announce Indyref2 will never look as good as it does
right now. Looking at the process of negotiating Brexit, however, the claim that the case for
Indyref2 is about the timing is a highly contestable one, write Daniel Kenealy and Stuart
MacLennan.
The UK and Scottish Governments are locked in a showdown over a second Scottish
independence referendum (Indyref2). Nicola Sturgeon is demanding one between autumn 2018
and spring 2019, indicating some flexibility over the timing. Theresa May responded by saying,
“now is not the time”, with the UK government focused on the challenge of delivering Brexit. Yet
it is Brexit – or what the SNP perceive as the ‘hard’ Brexit being pursued by the UK government
– that triggered the Indyref2 call. We remain in a ‘phony war’.
Sturgeon claims that the UK government has been unwilling to engage with her attempt to find a
Brexit compromise. But, what Sturgeon describes as compromise – the position set out in
Scotland’s Place in Europe – is no such thing. The paper outlined an all-but-impossible demand
and made that the litmus test of whether Theresa May was reasonable or unreasonable. As one
of us argued here before, it was a deeply flawed document: a cynical political move, not a
serious proposal to achieve a differentiated Brexit for Scotland. The SNP’s political strategy has
brought them to the position it was designed to, with a little help it must be said from Theresa May’s tone.
Both Sturgeon and May are appealing to a sense of national interest. Sturgeon claims to be acting on the basis of a
manifesto commitment to hold Indyref2 if a “significant and material change in circumstances” occurs. While the
SNP manifesto specifically cited Brexit as such a change in circumstances, it is a change that the SNP did little to
prevent and may not even be willing to reverse. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Scots want another
referendum, with polls suggesting a majority, at least for now, do not.
Sturgeon’s argument focuses on timing, sequencing, and process. She has remarked: “Scotland should have the
right to choose our own future, once the terms of Brexit are clear, but before it’s too late for us to choose a different
path … that means a window of autumn next year through to the spring of 2019.” Anybody who researches the EU
for a living knows that achieving a comprehensive deal on the future UK-EU relationship in eighteen months is
possible only in Alice’s Wonderland. What we will have – perhaps – by autumn 2018, is an agreement to keep
talking, a fairly threadbare agreement that formalises the divorce terms. A clearer picture will by then also have
emerged about what new powers the Scottish Parliament might receive as a result of Brexit.
Put simply, by autumn 2018 the picture will be coming into focus. And in the months leading up to it – months in
which the SNP wants to be engaged in a formal Indyref2 campaign – the most we’ll be able to engage with are
fragments of information from closed-door negotiations. We will be seeing through a glass, darkly. It would create
the risk that Indyref2 would be characterised by the emptiness of the EU referendum, as opposed to the richness of
the 2014 independence referendum.
Theresa May’s national interest argument rests on surer ground. The UK – which 55% of voters in Scotland’s 2014
referendum opted to stay a part of – is facing its biggest peacetime governmental challenge. The Institute for
Government has shown that Brexit is stretching Whitehall. Defending the UK national interest, and ensuring that the
UK as a whole has its best chance of securing a decent deal, cannot be squared with launching into Indyref2 now. Is
that a ‘selfish’ UK position? Yes. But then a majority of Scots voted, in essence, for the good of the whole (the UK) to
sometimes be considered ahead of the good of the part (Scotland). That’s the essence of a union.
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Sturgeon has been cagey in articulating the choice she wishes to offer Scots voters, saying they must get a vote
before it is “too late” to choose a different path. But the choice will not be between Brexit within the UK versus EU
membership outside of the UK. Barring a reversal of Brexit by the UK government, the inescapable reality is that
Scotland will be leaving the EU in 2019, as part of the UK. As such, there is no “too late” or “too early” calculation to
be made. The EU door – the front door, not some side door or back door, although watch this space for the Scottish
Government’s next all-but-impossible proposal – will be open for Scotland to apply for membership at any point in
the future.
We explored an independent Scotland’s membership of the EU during Indyref1. Although Scotland’s continued EU
membership would not have been automatic, it was likely to be seamless. We based our argument on the EU’s
general principles, including that of sincere cooperation. Scotland’s independence would result in a considerable
dislocation in the EU’s single market, which its institutions and Member States would be legally obliged to seek to
avoid. Scotland’s continued membership, we argued, could be secured through fairly simple amendments to the
treaties, rather than a full accession process.
However, post-Brexit, Scotland will have to apply through the standard process. The position of a territory seceding
from a state that itself is seceding from the EU (as would be the case in 2019 or beyond) is vastly different from a
territory seceding from a fully-fledged Member State (as was the case in 2014). The dislocation in the EU’s single
market would have already occurred, thus removing a key factor that would have worked in Scotland’s favour in
2014. During Indyref1, the EU maintained that it would not negotiate with Scotland until the latter became
independent. We argued that to wait until then would be tantamount to a dereliction of duty by the EU institutions.
But, at the very least, Scotland would have to wait until it voted for independence before it could begin negotiating
with the EU.
As one of us has already written, “Unless the Scottish Government proposes that a new state could be set up and
continued membership of the EU negotiated within the space of a month, Scotland will be leaving the EU.” Put
crudely, the task for the Scottish Government will be to keep track of the various new laws that Westminster might
pass after Brexit – laws that would not comply with EU law – so that they might be changed if and when Scotland
became independent and sought EU membership.
Yet there is uncertainty about whether Sturgeon would even seek EU membership for an independent Scotland.
Although EU membership remains official SNP policy, in recent days the idea has been floated of Scottish
membership of the European Economic Area instead. This is not entirely unreasonable. Given that Scotland’s two
major trading partners are the rest of the UK (63% of total trade) and the EU (16%), any solution that allows an
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independent Scotland to trade as freely as possible with both would arguably be the best. If the UK were outside of
the EU, that solution would be EEA membership for Scotland.
Of course, there may be a more compelling political explanation for this recent equivocation. Euroscepticism,
measured broadly, is on the rise in Scotland and more than a third of those who voted SNP in the 2015 general
election voted to leave the EU in 2016. Furthermore, for some voters (for example, fishermen) the prospect of
independence may, in fact, be more attractive if it doesn’t come with EU membership.
The situation is thus highly murky, with many uncertainties circulating. The SNP may, rightly, have concluded that
the political weather will never look as good for them as it does right now. But if the case for Indyref2 is about the
timing of Brexit, then the case is a shaky one.
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